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THE VIOLENT Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute which erupted on 6 May
'this year has taken everybody by surprise, includmg Ethiopian prime
minister Mêles Zenawi.1 But on a closer look, this dispute is not so
. surprising except for its timing, nor is it only about a border. The
'Wstorical and political context of this widely deplored family quarrel
between closely related regimes in Eritrea and Ethiopia makes this clear.
, -True, both regimes emerged from armed insurgent movements (EPLF
and TPLF)2 which were for many years comrades in arms against the
r former Ethiopian government of Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam.
• ; They both shared the same mix of ethno-regionalist/nationalist and
l^.'Marxist-Leninist ideology and both their political elites hail from the same
.;'•' etfano-linguistic group, the Tigrinya-speakers of northern Ethiopia and
, *N '^outhern Eritrea. After they took power m 1991, their leaders were also
?3f,, generously supported by the Western donor-community led by the USA as
s 'new-style' African leaders: relatively young, seemingly committed to
- > 4emocratization and a new approach to national development, aiming
S' at liberal market-economy reforms and at closer intégration with the
,x world community, especially the West.
3 But différences of opinion and
4\ divergent approaches to crucial policy matters existed between the two
« iriovements since the late 1970s and have not been resolved since.4
It is more than ironie in this conflict that the policies of these new leaders
*< seem to carry the same potential for violence and destabilization m the
région as that of old leaders.5 In this respect, the surprise about the
fr ' carrent border crisis reveals something of the incomplete historical under-
standing and the opportunism of certain donor countries. They often
^ The author is a senior researcher, Afrika-Studiecentrum, Umversity of Leiden. This article
$"" was wntten in late August
I, In a téléphone call on 13 May this year, hè is reputed to have angrily asked Entrean
k', president Isayas Afeworqi why hè had carried out violent unilatéral action m the border area
|' Without Consulting him first (they used to consult on important issues) Since then, both
leaders have had no direct talks.
,,, 2. The Entrean People's Liberation Movement and the Tigray People's Liberation
s Movement. The latter was broadened mto the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples's Revolutionary
Democratie Front) by the inclusion of three other groups orgamzed under lts wing. This
party dominâtes the present Ethiopian government
'̂'- 3. In the case of Entrea and Ethiopia, the West (especially the United States) saw their
potential rôle as a buffer against the Islamist regime m Sudan.
4, The best survey of this is J. Young, 'The Tigray and Entrean Peoples Liberation Fronts
a history of tensions and pragmatism', Journal of Modem Afncan Studies, 34, l (1996),
pp. 105-120.
5. Laurent-Désire Kabila m ex-Zaïre is another obvious example of a failed 'new leader'
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seem more satisfied with the semblance of 'stability' and with thé rhetoric
of democracy and development than with their delivery.
This article will contend that thé éruption of violent conflict in the
Ethiopian-Eritrean border area is neither unexpected nor the result of a real
border dispute, and is due to (1) the particular history and relationship of
the two insurgent movements turned national governments (EPLF and
TPLF) in the two countries; (2) the nature and héritage of neo-patrimonial
elite rule and the lack of democratie restructuring in the two countries; and
(3) the economie problems of Eritrea as an independent state. These
three éléments will be briefly discussed after an overview of the current
conflict.
Fighting
On 6 May 1998, Eritrean troops crossed the de facto western border
between Eritrea and Ethiopia and occupied die village of Badme, followed
by a larger effort on 12 May to establish themselves in the surrounding
area.6 Local inhabitants were people who had counted themselves as
Ethiopians (Tigrayans), because they had always paid taxes to Ethiopia and
had been politically and judicially administered by Ethiopian authorities.7
However, over the past decade, several thousand people from Eritrea in
search of farmland or alluvial gold had also settled in the area, and
misunderstandings over the border had been occurring here and
elsewhere. After the fighting in May, the area was placed under Eritrean
rule. Most of the local people fled further south into Tigray.
In the subséquent weeks, fighting also erupted in three other border
localities more to the east: Altena, Zalambessa, and Buré, south of the port
city of Asseb. Eritrean forces made slight advances on all these fronts, but
were prevented from moving further inland. In the skirmishes several
thousand people, troops and civilians, are estimated to have been killed.
In all, more than 130,000 people were displaced and lost their possessions.
Local buildings, property and churches were allegedly destroyed and
looted. After the fighting on the Badme front, the Eritrean airforce
bombed the Tigrayan towns of Meqele and Adigrat (some 70 people were
killed and hundreds wounded), while Ethiopia almost simultaneously
bombed Asmara's airforce base (one person killed, a few dozen wounded).
Eritrea's air strikes on civilian not military targets (residential areas,
schools, hospitals, grain stores, factories) shocked and angered the
Ethiopians. Since July there has been a US-brokered moratorium on air
6. See Rosalind Russell, 'Ethiopia says unprepared for Eritrean invasion', Reuters dispatch,
14 June 1998.
7. The Eritreans had not claimed this area at indépendance m 1993, nor did they contest the
Ethiopian élections held there in 1992-95, nor the Ethiopian census of 1994. Results of the
census m the localities now claimed as Eritrean territory (Badme, Altena, Zalambessa,
Shiraro) are found m: Central Statistical Authonty, The 1994 Population and Housmg Census for
Ethiopia. Results for Tigray, Vol. I, pp. 11, 13 (CSA, Addis Ababa, 1995).
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Strikes, while ground fighting has largely subsided since about the sarne
Ome.
Economie effects and expulsions
The economie effects of the conflict were immediately feit: both
countries eut air and road links, téléphone lines and cross-border
trade. In Eritrea priées for staple foods shot up. Eritrea held back all
goods in the port of Asseb destined for Ethiopia, to a value of tens of
•millions of dollars, and Ethiopia diverted all its shipping for Massawa and
Asseb to Djibouti port, and threatened to block other ships from docking in
the Eritrean ports.8
In June this year, both countries also started to expel citizens of the
'enemy country', a process which led to incidents of intimidation, harass-
Hient, robbery and plunder, and worse. The Ethiopian government
media, and also the country's independent press, have described serious
abuse, repression, forceful expulsion, torture and killings of Ethiopians in
Eritrea. Eritrea's government media soon followed suit and exposed
ïromerous cases of unwarranted expulsion and serious maltreatment
perpetrated against Eritreans in Ethiopia. Most of these stories are
difficult to check as to numbers and the nature of the abuse, but accounts
in the independent Ethiopian press (which allegedly relied on local
eorrespondents and interviewed returning eye-witnesses) and in some
• Eritrean reports are alarming. The Ethiopians have allowed international
observers, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to visit
détention camps and witness expulsions, while Eritrea has not yet.9 It
must be emphasized that due to exaggerated reports and sometimes
propaganda from both sides, the real story of the expulsions and the abuses
will not be known for some time.
- Mediation
'• Mediation efforts in this conflict have been intensive, with a string of
African leaders—including Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, Djibouti's Hassan
' Gouled, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, and Kenya's Daniel arap Moi—passing
-by in both capitals. Several others, including présidents Mubarak of
Bgypt and Gadhafi of Libya, offered their good offices. But all in
win. Also the UN, US-Rwandan facilitators and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) have tried their best, but compromise proposais by
jéspecially the OAU (the most recent ones prepared during its meetings in
Ouagadougou in early August) were rejected by Eritrea (because it was
8» Evoking veiled threats of retahation from Eritrean president Isayas Afeworqi: see his
interview with The Times, 12 June 1998.
' 9, On 14 August, they gave permission for UN human rights investigators to examine cases
of expulsions of Ethiopians from Eritrea. Eritrea is not a signatory of either the Geneva
-Conventions or the African Chaner on Human Rights and People's Rights.
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suggested by the OAU that Badme was administered by Ethiopia before
6 May), while Ethiopia restated its erstwhile position that negotiations on
the border could only start after withdrawal of the Entrean military from its
terntory There is a war of words even on what happened on the ground.
But it is fairly certain that Entrean troops are now in an area where they -
were not present before 6 May 1998,10 and that they later also opened the
fronts near Altena, Buré and Zalambessa. Meanwhile that there were
small-scale incidents and possibly provocations from both sides seems clear
enough, as these have frequently been discussed in meetings of the joint
border commission during the past years.
But the OAU said in its statement of l August 1998, according to
Reuters: 'What happened in Badme between 6 and 12 May constitutes a
fundamental element of crises . . . The challenge is to find a solution to
that particular problem.' This is the most diplomatic way of saying that
Eritrea moved into the Badme area and kept it occupied. This fact is no
longer disputed by anybody not even Eritrea, because they claimed
subsequently that they '... only retook land that was already theirs' and '
could not retreat from it.1J A breakthrough in this situation of deadlock
was therefore not achieved. In mid-August, an ominous silence had fallen
upon the front hnes. But the propaganda campaigns, the international
médiation efforts and the military préparations went on.
What seems certain in this conflict is that the impact of the international
community on its final outcome will be very limited. This also applies to
the OAU, initially hailed by both sides as the best mediator. It cannot be
otherwise in a conflict whose roots go back to the very spécifie history of
tensions between the two insurgent movements, TPLF and EPLF, during
the armed struggle in the 1970s and 1980s. This history, which is not
taken into account by most outside observers, is the enduring frame of
référence for political action of the leadership elites in Eritrea and
Ethiopia. It is in these terms and agamst this background that these
leaders will seek a solution. It should not be forgotten that these two
movements, though influenced by revolutionary Marxist-socialist ideas,
were strongly inward-looking, largely self-sufncient, and geared to the
spécifie Ethiopian-Eritrean situation.
Contesting the border
The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, after the de facto independence
of Eritrea in May 1991, was that of the Italian colony of Eritrea, established
in 1890, and confirmed in treaties in 1897 (after the Battle of Adwa), 1900
10 In an interview on Entrean Télévision on 8 July 1998, President Isayas was reported to
have said 'Even if the sun doesn't nse, we will never withdraw from Badme', thereby
admittmg that Entrean troops were there He also said his country was ready to go to war
and face adverse économie conséquences if this was necessary, Reuters dispatch, 9 July 1998.
11 Cf the Ethiopian private paper Reporter, 22 June 1998, and BBC World News, l June
1998, 17-39 GMT
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and 1902 between Italy and the Ethiopian emperor Minilik II. On the
whole, the line of this border was well-known and was generally respected
.except for limited areas where Italy continued to encroach, up to its
foft-scale invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. After her occupation, Italy
rejected all agreed maps and treaties and imposed her own. Nevertheless,
wMe detailed démarcations on the ground had not been made (partly
because much of it was umnhabited at the time of the treaty-making, and
no necessity for it was seen), before 1935 it was usually clear on the basis
of-the treaty maps who was administered by which government and who
identified with what.
When Eritrea gained its de facto independence in 1991, the Italian
colonial borders as agreed in the treaties of the beginning of this Century
were taken as a point of departure, with the proviso that details would have
to~~be decided upon. In the course of the current dispute, Eritrea,
however, contended that a unilateral Italian map of 1934 should serve as
thé basis of the démarcation, but this seems to be contrary to the treaties
arld to international law, and has not been accepted by Ethiopia. In the
present conflict, Italy even had the temerity to offer médiation on the basis
of its colonial maps—an unhelpful if not arrogant gesture which found
nö'serious response from either side.12 In the post-1991 period, there
were border crossings by people and militias of both countries, but
disagreements had always been settled locally.
During the libération struggle of EPLF and TPLF, there were some
disputes on the exact border between the two countries to be, but this was
seen as a minor point which they expected to solve later. They also
thought that they, as insurgent movements, could not simply establish a
new international border. In the past years an Eritrean-Ethiopian border
commission worked on the issue, right up to the outbreak of hostilities
, on 6 May.13
The conflict, then, is plagued by the héritage of Italian colonialism, to
which Eritrea as a state largely traces its identity as a separate territory and
nation.14 Before the 1890s, Eritrea was known as the Bahr Negash area
aiid, although mfiltrated by Italians since 1869, could be considered as a
part of the Ethiopian highland polity. This held especially for the
Tigrinya-speaking group (some 50 percent of the total) and for other ethmc
groups like the Afar and Kunama, though less so for the pastoral nomadic
Islamic peoples in the lowlands. During the libération struggle in the
1970s and 1980s, the Badme area was first occupied by the Entrean
12.» See Addis Tribune, 31 July 1998
137" On 9 May, the Entrean délégation did not turn up for the talks and left Addis Ababa
without givmg notice
14 See also C. Clapham, 'Boundary and terntory m the Horn of Afnca', m P Nugent &
Ajül. Asiwaju eds., African Boundanes- hamers, conduits and opportunités (Pmter, London,
'- Î996), p 242
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Liberation Front (ELF), a largely Muslim movement. When the ELF was
forced out of Eritrea by the rival EPLF, who replaced it as the dominant
libération movement m the mid-1970s, the latter's ally, the TPLF, took it
over with the understanding that details about the exact national borders
were to be settled with the EPLF later.
Backgrounds
The border dispute is all about the politics of state survival. Eritrea as
a new independent state was always closely linked to the present EPRDF
regime in Addis Ababa and was crucially assisted by the latter in political
and economie terms. But eternal friendship between the two was not
guaranteed. The fact is that the TPLF and the EPLF, which form the
core of the present regimes in the two countries, were by no means
unconditional allies in the insurgency against the regimes of Emperor Haile
Sellassie and of Mengistu, but, as sectarian movements, had an inherently
problematic relationship. Although they were condemned to support
each other in the military struggle, there were crucial issues of conflict,
rooted in the diverging social and political histories and idéologies of the
two movements.15 These issues do not explain the current border con-
flict, but indicate some of the inherent tensions between the two regimes.
First, there were ideological différences on the struggle for 'national
libération and self-détermination'. The TPLF, which ultimately opted for
a take-over of the central state and not for Tigray independence (although
this formula was in its first programme of 1976), recognized the old
Stalinist clause on the right of nationalities, defined as ethno-linguistic
groups, to 'national self-détermination, up to and including sécession'.
The Eritreans, bound to their view of Eritrea as a territorial colony of Italy
and later Ethiopia, did not. They claimed that the colonial expérience
had forced an Eritrean identity over and above ethno-religious différences
among its nine ethnie groups. The TPLF strove for a 'voluntary union of
the nationalities in Ethiopia' and inserted the right to sécession in the new
Ethiopian Constitution of 1995. Both policies are in a state of tension
because 'nationalities' like the Afar, the Tigreans, the Saho and the
Kunama straddle the border. This, coupled to problems arising from the
Muslim-Christian divide, has led to lingering insecurity of the Eritrean
leadership about the domestic political situation.
Second, the Fronts differed in other details of socialist theory and
practice. While both coupled their armed struggle to social révolution in
the countryside they controlled, there were différences in approach and
in socialist policy. Some of these were typical Marxist squabbles, such
15 For a new and path-breakmg study of the history of modern Entrea m relation to
Ethiopia, see Tekeste Negash, Entrea and Ethiopia. the fédéral expenence (Nordiska Afhka-
instimtet, Uppsala, 1997). For the political disagreements between the two Fronts, see
J. Young, 'The Tigray and Eritrean People's Liberation Fronts', pp. 112f
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as about thé 'social-impemlist' nature of the Soviet Union. Others were
about thé way of mobilizing thé peasantry and about the re-organization of
rural society. These factors had some impact as well on the nature of
warfare with the Derg. The EPLF, after the initial phase of pure guerrilla
warfare, preferred more conventional combat with large-scale battles from
fixed positions. The TLPF remained more dependent on surprise
attacks, the high mobility of units, tactical retreats, etc, only choosing
large-scale battle if they were sure they could win.16 These military
notions had an impact on their relations with the population, and still have
a lingering effect.
Third, there was a history of unspecified territorial claims between the
Fronts. As both guerrilla movements were dominated by Tigrinya-
Speakers, the delineation of a border between Tigray and Eritrea was a
delicate issue. Joint talks on this during the years of struggle did not yield
agreements.
Fourth, there are also psychological factors, always underestimated.
The impact of the colonial Italian administration (1890-1941) and the
British mandate period (1941-1952) gave middle-class, politically active
Eritreans a self-image of being more advanced than the 'backward
Ethiopians'. This self-perception was remforced in the libération war and
is still very potent in the political arena. In recent years it led to Ethiopian
Stereotyping of Eritreans as arrogant towards Ethiopians (a result of recent
political developments but at variance with reality when applied to the
common people). In the case of the two Fronts this was stimulated by the
EPLF being the senior in the partnership with TPLF during the years of
armed struggle. The former had assisted in the organization and training
of the younger TPLF, although the latter achieved its own strong
identity. (The two Fronts completely broke off relations in the years
1985-1988.)
Fifth, Eritrea has an apparent need to contmuously assert itself politically
in the région. It has conflicts with Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, and now
Ethiopia. The Eritrean leadership has repeatedly said it will not tolerate
any government hostile to Eritrea.
In the post-1991 libération period these problems have come together in
the issue of the nature of political authority. Both regimes suffer from a
political culture of autocratie rule where absolute power is cherished. One
could argue that after the 1991 victory they seamlessly fitted into a model
of neo-patrimonial politics. Neo-patrimonialism is seen hère in a com-
parative sensé and held to be a political model of (a) personalized,
authoritarian rule, extended with strong bonds of personal loyalty, and (b)
control and distribution of economie resources in a group constituted by
16. Negash, Entrea and Ethiopia, Young, 'The Tigray and Eritrean People's Liberation
Front'.
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such personalized bonds.17 Power is thus a patrimony not democratically,
or meritocratically, accessible to others.
There is insufficient space to elaborate on this, but the regimes in
Ethiopia and Eritrea, despite their social-revolutionary credentials, do have
such néo-patrimonial traits, which fonction to maintain elite rule and
authority of a strictly organized dominant party. The two régimes came to
power on a programme of libération from autocracy, standing for thé
interests of thé broad mass of the population, and for freer political arïd
économie development. The realization of this programme has been
incomplete. Both governments issued from tightly-knit élite groups with
a tradition of authoritarian rule and (ethnie) group cohésion. As govern-
mentSj they hâve shown indifférence towards the spirit and the institutions -
of democracy, dialogue and impartial justice, in favour of political control '-
and régime stability. They hâve a dominant (in the case of Eritrea, single) '
party political structure with no significant opportunities for opposition
groupings to participate, and they rule with subservient parliaments that
hâve no légal right of initiative. Both regimes have practised fairly
authoritarian elite rule, to a significant extent geared to their own ethnie
group. They govern without any strongly institutionalized rule of law.
Critics say their power seems ultimately still based on the gun and on tight
control and regimentation of social life. This approach was successful in
a guerrilla war against an extremely centralist and deeply repressive regime
(Mengistu),18 but is not necessarily suitable to run a country in peacê
time. At the same time, the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes seem unable
to modify this approach, because of, first, structural and ideological
limitations, and second, the stakes being so high, especially in Eritrea with
its promising but weak economy, characterized by very low export yields.
The adverse effects of such elite rule and of failed democratie institution-
alization on domestic and regional stability will be feit in the coming years.
A third and more direct domain of tension is that of the economie
Problems of the new state of Eritrea. These result from its strong
dependence on Ethiopia in most respects (food imports, export markets,
raw materials, crédits), which makes the country vulnérable. In 1997, the
Ethiopian government tried to adjust its until then rather Eritrea-friendly
economie policy.19 Many observers see this as the central reason for the
timing of the conflict: by forcefully bringing up the border issue, the
Eritrean government has put pressure on the Ethiopian leadership and tried
to force it to return to a more Eritrea-favourable position by way of
inducing the pro-Eritrea factions in the ruling EPRDF to assert
17. Cf. M. Bratton & N van de Walle, Democratie Experiments m Afnca (Cambridge
Umversity Press, Cambridge, 1997), p. 61f.
18. Cf. D. Pool, 'The Eritrean People's Liberation Front', m C. Clapham, ed., Afhcan
Guemllas (lames Currey, Oxford, 1997), pp. 27-28.
19. For one economist's account, see Addis Tnbune, 31 July 1998.
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themselves.20 It has also used its ports as a bargaining chip: port dues
paid by land-locked Ethiopia were one of the most important sources of
income for thé Eritrean state. All this shows that, despite thé promising
beginnings and thé healthy emphasis on its own resources, the economie
viability of Eritrea is still very precarious and that in practice it is very much
tied to Ethiopia.
The economie tensions came to a height last year, when Eritrea
introduced its own currency (the naqfa) after seven years of privileged use
of the Ethiopian bin (because of the more favourable fiscal regime in
Eritrea) and of the Ethiopian banking system providing generous loans.
Contrary to expectations, Ethiopia then demanded all trans-border trade
above 2000 birr to be conducted in hard currency, and not in birr or
naqfa. The Eritreans were further angered when Ethiopia immediately
issued new currency notes, thus declaring all birr still held by Eritrea,
intended for use in purchasing Ethiopian goods and services from the
Ethiopian market, where the weak naqfa would not be populär, as null and
void, although Eritrea later got the chance to change all the old birr into
new. Parity between birr and naqfa was also rejected by the Ethiopians
(the rate just before the outbreak of hostilities was one èzVr=five naqfa). In
addition, at the time of the currency change in November 1997, the
Eritrean banks had run into bad debts to the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
to the extent of l .2 billion birr, which is probably now an irrecoverable loss
for Ethiopia.21 Such problems, it is now claimed by observers critical of
the Ethiopian government, were the result of an unclear and non-reciprocal
policy, economically favouring Eritrea.
Redéfinitions of boundary and national identity
The current conflict is the direct result of the unresolved and ambiguous
political relationship between the two countries, and the two leaderships'
policy of making deals without securing a broad national consensus or
legally clear formulas. (Economie, military and security agreements are
still not made public). The conséquences can be serious.
It is clear that important changes will come about in the sphère of activity
and the status of Eritreans in Ethiopia. This is already evident from the
expulsions mentioned above. This status is an extremely complicated and
sensitive point. An estimated 350,000 Eritreans live in Ethiopia. Many
of them are recent immigrants and former military personnel who came in
1991, but most of them were bom and bred there. They are now declared
Eritrean because their parents were originally from Eritrea (then Ethiopia,
or before 1941 the Italian Colony). Many of them are proud of their new
20. Asserted by L Santoro, 'At the root of an odd Afncan war. money', Christian Science
Monitor, 22 June 1998.
21. See the Ethiopian independent weeldy T'obbiya, 6 August 1998.
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independent motherland Eritrea, but others are relatively indifferent.
Also, some 60,000 Eritreans in Ethiopia voted in the 1993 Eritrean
referendum for independence (an anomaly, because they were also
Ethiopian citizens). Their de facto dual citizenship accorded them
privileges compared to the average Ethiopian citizen (e.g., advantages in
cross-border trading, getting crédits, the right to bear arms) but this will
now probably be revised. The Ethiopian government now claims, in a
complete reversai of earlier policy, that many Eritreans are allegedly a
security risk, especially those that have served in the EPLF army (tens of
thousands) and those who are (still) in high positions in Ethiopia (in
government or in business). The impending changes have induced in-
security and fear among Eritreans in Ethiopia,22 and have also led to ,
many personal tragedies, e.g., sudden job loss without compensation,
forced migration, the abandoning of children and the splitting up of
mixed Ethiopian-Eritrean marriages because of the émergence of 'doublé
loyalties' in the wake of this conflict.
The expulsions of Eritreans from Ethiopia are thus very controversial:23
many were dismissed for being 'agents of the Eritrean regime' giving
fmancial support and inside intelligence information to their government
(and the Ethiopian government has good records of that, because the
Eritreans used to be close allies within Ethiopia). But hundreds of others
have been expelled arbitrarily and see their lives, careers and éducation
destroyed (e.g., many 'Eritrean' students at Addis Ababa University being
rounded up, interned or expelled, to the dismay of most of their Ethiopian
friends).24 Most of those expelled had to leave their assets, which were
frozen or given in legal custody to friends and others, and were limited in
what they could take out of the country.
The position of Ethiopians in Eritrea has also been extremely
precarious. In fact, massive expulsion of Ethiopians in Eritrea already
started in 1991 and led to at least 50,000 people (traders, workers in the
port of Asseb and in industry and services, Ethiopian army personnel and
government administrators) being sent out without any of their
possessions. Many thousands of them today still live in the streets of
Addis Ababa in self-built shanties of plastic, stones and corrugated iron
sheets, jobless and without government support. In fact, stories about the
maltreatment, abuse and killings of Ethiopians in Eritrea at that time were
suppressed for seven years but are now appearing even in the Ethiopian
22. The highly symbohc exécution on 2 June 1998 of Jeraal Yassm Mohamed, an Eritrean
convicted last year for kilhng the populär TPLF-general Hayalom Araya, also contributed to
this.
23. Accordmg to the Ethiopian government, more than 10,000 Eritreans had been expelled
by mid-August 1998.
24. See T'obbiya of 6 August 1998, protestmg agamst this Also the independent paper
Mebruk, on 25 June 1998, warned agamst 'revenge' on Eritreans m général.
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government press. The new wave of expulsions seems to be even more
dramatic and violent.25
In the wake of this conflict, the two governments will probably redefme
the status and nationality of the Ethiopians and Eritreans in the respective
countries m a legally clearer manner. In the meantime, however, contacts
and the mobility of people between the two countries will be severely
restricted and mutual suspicion will increase.
Politica! tension in the post-1991 era
Eritrea and Ethiopia have regimes that issued from successful Marxist-
Leninist insurgent movements that were of military orientation and marked
by strict central control and elite cohésion and discipline. They were good
at mobilizing their people and revolutionizing life in the countryside, but
not in developing a pluralist System on the national level to accommodate
'différences of opinion, democratie decision-making and consensus
thinking. Political structures are still top-down, 'democratie-centralist',
and monolithic. Most senior figures in both countries think it cannot
' be otherwise in the light of local political culture and socio-economic
conditions.
The expérience of the past seven years, a period that did yield many new
opportunities, has been that, on the genera! level, the political culture of
autocracy and of fear and respect for authority that existed in these
countries has been maintained. Second, on the more immédiate political
level there is still a fundamental lack of institutionalized democracy in both
countries. Democracy not only in the sense of free and fair élections,
unencumbered political party life, a free press, free civil society, national
debate with opposition groups, or fair justice and rule of law, but also in the
public mentality of the elites to run a country with a modicum of tolérance,
openness, fairness and political goodwill. Authoritarianism and neo-
patrimonialism thus continue to mark the structures of political and public
life. Notwithstanding gains made relative to the Marxist-communist
dictatorship of Mengistu, crucial national issues have been decided upon
without the people having a real say. Examples are: the political-electoral
System, the re-division of the country into ethnie régions, the exclusion of
opposition groups to play a rôle, the political co-optation of civil society
organizations like the CETU trade union and the ETA teachers' union, the
Bon-transparent privatization policy, or the unconditional split-off of
25. One of the worst reported (first in the Ethiopian independent weekly Mimhk, 18 July
• 3998) was the détention of Ethiopian workers m Asseb m a métal container which was then
placed m the blazing sun At the end of the day, almost all the sixty victims had died of heat
and asphyxiation. Although eyewitness accounts exist (see the 'Ethiopia-Entrea Conflict
Page', website Http://www geocities.com/Eureka/Park/5875) the incident has not been con-
firmed from independent sources. Incidentally, donor-country or UN mission reports
looking mto the allégations of abuse by both sides are incomplete and unreliable for a variety
of reasons.
562 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Eritrea, whereby nothing was negotiated except a 'free access to the ports '
on the Red Sea' (as it now appears, without guarantee).26 This generaï j
lack of debate and consensus on issues of national interest and the lack' '
of sufficiently democratie institutions have been enduring sources of
tension within Ethiopia, and indeed can be partly held responsible for the
émergence of the present quarrel with Eritrea.
Future relations
The conflict has sealed the irréversible sécession of Eritrea from
Ethiopia. Ethiopians in all walks of life, while deploring this fact in itself,
do not want Eritrea back, but they want to press it to stand on its own feet
(although 'irredentist' Ethiopians think this the chance to get back Eritrea
altogether, but it is unclear for what benefit and for whom). :
However, what is most regrettable is that the antagonism and, in many
cases, the hatred that has been generaled by policies and rhetoric of the two
regimes is now sinking down to the level of daily life and inter-persona!
relationships. This is a new and very significant fact resulting from the
present border conflict. Previously, any deep-rooted antipathy between
the common people was prevented by religieus, cultural and historical
similarities, intermarriage and integrated economie activities. The fact
that people now start to deny these éléments, or choose to emphasize that
which differentiates them, is a dubious 'achievement' of the policy of the
two regimes. If this was their aim, then they have succeeded: if the
present regime in Asmara holds, Eritrea will not return, not even in a
confédération, to Ethiopia in the foreseeable future.
Internai changes
The conflict with Eritrea has shown that the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia
has to broaden its base of support in the country. Opposition forces had
already insisted on this for seven years and had extended this demand to
the redressing of the relation of Ethiopia with Eritrea, but only now are
their views being appropriated by the regime. One also sees unprec-
edented criticism by EPRDF and government leaders of the Eritrean ;
regime, of a type already made by opposition figures and the independent **
press in the years before.27 ,j
The process of gaining broader acceptance is by no means easy for the ;••
Ethiopian government. So far, there has been a spontaneous process from %
below, with Ethiopians everywhere expressing support for the defence of -j
the territorial integrity of the country. The fédéral leadership is, so to -,]
26. E.g., the referendum on the indépendance of Entrea—unnl then part of Ethiopia—was ;
held without any Ethiopian rôle m the matter. It was unconditionally granted by the then ,"'
Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by the EPRDF. '.
27. One example are the comments by TPLF Politbureau-member Abay Tsehaye» ^
interviewed by Rosalmd Russell, Reuters, 8 June 1998. ä
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spesk, 'being reclaimed' by the old tradition of Ethiopian nationhood, but
what this will mean in political-institutional terms is uncertain.
For Eritrea, changes might be forthcoming in the leadership and also
in its policies of achieving more democratie structures. It can show
some economie recovery since 1991, but political liberalization has lagged
behind. Some have asserted that despite the war of independence being
over since 1991, the country is still run like an army camp. Perhaps a
move away from an authoritarian and parochial leadership style might be
demanded by both the public and éléments of the army. If the govern-
ment does not deliver, more discontent may émerge, especially when the
Eritrean public gets more access to independent information.
Prófpects
After the Eritrean bombing of a school and a hospital in June, some
people in Tigray's capital town of Meqele were heard to say: 'We don't
Ûnâerstand any more: we have been told by the government all the time in
the" past years that our worst enemies were "the Amhara" and so on, and
that our best friends were the Eritreans. Now we find that these best
friends are bombing our people here in Tigray, in Meqele, in Adigrat,
while the Amhara and the others come to our rescue and to défend our
country .. ,'28
This may not be entirely correct, but such thoughts préfigure the changes
to come in the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the wake of the
border conflict. National identity in Ethiopia is résurgent and the EPRDF
leadership is forced to deal with the call for the defence of the nation's
boündaries. It will, however, try to do this without endangering its
hegemony, and thus with minimal concessions to opposition forces and the
Ethiopian public at large. As Mengistu did during and after the war
agajnst Somalia in 1977-78, cooptation and neutralisation will be the
preïerred strategy. Further democratization of the Ethiopian polity thus
remains precarious.
Eritrea has taken a domestic and international risk in escalating the
tensions on the border and escalating armed conflict in the disputed Badme
area. In this border crossing also, the pattern of Eritrea's conflicts with
Yemen and Djibouti is visible: first create military facts on the ground and
then call for neutral, third-party, unconditional face-to-face negotiations.29
But it is not certain that the outcome will be similar. The décision to
move in with füll force could have been a miscalculation by the Eritrean
leadership on the Ethiopian résolve and capacity to défend the borders.
But more likely it was a conscious move to force the Ethiopian leadership
to modify its new policies towards Eritrea, or to induce changes in the
28. Personal communications from travellers returnmg from Meqele met by the author,
July 1998.
29. See also Afnca Confidential, 29 May 1998.
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leadership alignment within the TPLF/EPRDF. In the process, Eritrea
can also draw attention away from economie difficulties and from internai
dissent (Afar and Béni Amer areas;30 grumblmgs about the lack of progress
in establishing a democratie political System), although puzzlement will
always remain as to the précise reasons why violence was used when surely
a more assertive political offensive might also have worked. Eritrea may
here overestimate its military strength and economie stamina. It has, of
course, a good army of highly motivated and experienced fighters, but so
have the Ethiopians (i.e. of the TPLF, the core of the ruling EPRDF).
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that although in the late 1970s the
TPLF grew in strength to a large extent under the wing of the EPLF, the
décisive blow to the Derg armies of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1989-91 (in
so far as these did not crumble of their own in the last years of the war), was
inflicted by the TPLF forces.
Faced with the Ethiopian potential, especially if the country emphasizes
national unity again, Eritrea will thus have to appeal to other countries
or donors to remforce its diplomatic position, economie prospects and
military capacity. They will include notably Middle Eastern and Islamic
countries with an interest in the Red Sea area. There was already talk in
July this year of Eritrea planning to join the Arab League, a suprême irony
for a country where more than 50 percent of the population is Orthodox
Christian, is not ethnically Arab, and where Arabic (though an official
language and used by Muslim middle-class elites) is the indigenous
language only of the 6,000-strong Rashaida people.31 Such a move might
probably also run into some résistance among the Tigrinya-speaking
population.
The short-term success of Eritrea's offensive has been to put the issue
of Ethiopian-Eritrean boundaries/relations on the agenda of regional
(Ethiopian-Eritrean relations, Intergovernmental Authority on Drought
and Development) and international politics (OAU, UN, donor-
countries). Whether it will ultimately lead to lasting success is another
matter. Eritrea's actions have met with surprise and scepticism in most of
the world press and among donor-countries. Ethiopia has, in the opinion
of most observers, shown a more restrained approach to the issues at hand,
and has de-escalated the military situation. A level-headed analysis would
probably also show that the légal case of Ethiopia is somewhat stronger
than the Eritrean one. But for a peaceful resolution, both sides have to
meet half-way and to discuss the fundamentals of their relationship in a
wider context.
30. The Ethiopian govemment claims that several thousand Eritrean Afar have fled to
Ethiopia
31. Abdallah Gabber, a close political advisor to Président Isayas Afeworqi, said m an
interview with thé United Arab Emirates' newspaper Al Khaleej (2 July 1998) that Entres
would eventually jom the Arab League
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The coming months will probably see a continuation of diplomatie
efforts by thé OAU, thé UN and some donor-country ambassadors to
break thé dead-lock marked by Eritrea's refusai to accept the above-
mentioned international peace initiatives, and by Ethiopia's refusai to talk
before the invaded territory is vacated. A steady military build-up on both
sides will continue as well.32 If thé diplomatie effort meets with further
résistance on both sides, and if thé leadership in both countries cannot
break lose from its inherited siège mentality and power arrogance, then a
çtotracted front-line war, together with air raids and sabotage actions, is
lifeely (perhaps starting from November-December, in thé dry season).
The décision to start such a war will again be partly dépendent on thé
degree to which thé pro-Eritrean element is able to maintain itself within
Ethiopia's leadership. The outcome of further armed confrontation is by
no means certain. Ethiopia has more equipment and manpower (though
many new untrained recruits), and more economie resources to sustain a
War, but Eritrea has a better army organization, more experienced fighters
and better and newer military hardware, except for its air force.
The général results of war are of course predictable, apart from tragic
loss of life (a) sévère économie damage, less foreign Investment and général
subversion of promising socio-économie development efforts initiated in
both countries, (b) a weakening of their position in thé région (e.g.,
vis-à-vis Sudan, Egypt, and thé Somalis), and (c) more internai dissent,
instability, and probably increased state repression in both countries. The
loser in this conflict will probably face serious political difficulties, even
regime change. But in this conflict the common people will again be thé
biggest losers, victims of 'new leaders' who hâve lacked responsibility and
democratie spirit, all too often uncritically supported by world powers not
bothered by their own blissful ignorance of thé intricacies of local history.
Again, political history in Northeast Africa makes a füll circle.
32. Eritrea, m fact, already had starled to call up ex-combatants m late 1997 See
Economist Intelligence Un«, Entrea-Somaha-Dßboutr Country profile 1997-98 (London,
1997), p. 7.
